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1. INTRODUCTION
A central problem in the study of collective behavior is how functionally significant macroscopic prop-
erties arise out of individual or microscopic interactions. The most common approach to studying the
relationship between the micro and macro in biological systems is dynamical systems and pattern
formation (for examples, see Sumpter, 2006; Ball, 2009; Couzin, 2009; Payne et al., 2013). A comple-
mentary approach is to treat the micro to macro mapping explicitly as a computation.
Amacroscopic property can be said to be an output of a computation if it can take on values that have
functional consequences at the group or component level, is the result of a distributed and coordinated
sequence of component interactions under the operation of a strategy set, and is a stable output of
input values that converges (terminates) in biologically relevant time [Flack and Krakauer 2011][Flack
2014].
The input to the computation is the set of elements implementing the rules or strategies. The input
plus the strategies constitute the system’s microscopic behavior. My collaborators and I have devel-
oped novel computational techniques, called Inductive Game Theory [DeDeo et al. 2010][Flack and
Krakauer 2011][Lee et al. 2014], to extract strategic decision-making rules from correlations observed
in the time series data and reconstruct the microscopic behavior.
In biological systems, there are typically multiple components interacting. Hence the computation
of the macroscopic output is inherently collective, meaning we must examine how different configu-
rations of strategies affect the macroscopic output [Flack 2014]. We describe the space of microscopic
configurations using Markovian, probabilistic, “social” circuits [DeDeo et al. 2010][Flack and Krakauer
2011][Lee et al. 2014].
Here, we briefly illustrate this approach using time series data collected on conflict dynamics from an
animal society model system—a large, captive group of captive pigtailed macaques (Macaca nemest-
rina) (n = 47). We start with very simple time series data on which individuals were present in a
conflict. This gives us a time series of binary fight participation vectors. Given this input of individual
identities, our output is the distribution of fight sizes, which has been shown to have functional conse-
quences for individuals in the study system [DeDeo et al. 2010]. We ask whether individuals decide to
join fights based on participation in the last fight (say between their allies and adversaries), what are
their decision-making strategies, and how do these strategies collectively produce the distribution of
fight sizes?
2. STRATEGY EXTRACTION AND CIRCUIT CONSTRUCTION
We begin by defining a space of strategies. Since we are interested in how individuals join fights and
have limited a priori our input data to identity of fight participants, we can represent this space of
strategies as c(n,m), wherem-tuplet of individuals in the fight at time t is determined by the behavior
of an n-tuplet of individuals in the fight at time t − 1 [DeDeo et al. 2010]. We restrict the C(n,m)
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space we explore to C(1, 1), C(2, 1), and C(1, 2) the simplest strategies in the space as cognitive and
behavioral data indicate that the macaques are capable of using these strategies.
Choosing C(n,m) specifies the identity of the vertices between which can allow for strategic con-
nections. The directed edges correspond to strategic information from m to n and we compute these
as
∆P (it−1 → jt) =
N(jt|it−1)−Nnull(jt|it−1)
N(i)
(1)
N(i) is the total number of events in which the n-tuplet i participated at all times t−1, andN(jt|it−1) is
the number of events in which them-tuplet j participated at t given i in the previous event.Nnull is the
average calculated over time permutations of the fights while maintaining the participation integrity
of each event (e.g. we only shuffle the order of events; we do not shuffle participation).
The∆P corresponds to a measurement of how often j follows i as a deviation from shuffle time series.
Positive (negative) values indicate that j is more (less) likely to follow i than by chance. Since ∆P is
normalized to −1 to 1, we interpret these values probabilistically where negative values correspond to
a suggestion of strategic avoidance in the following fight.
We use the list of ∆P found for each C(n,m) strategy class to construct a social circuit for each
strategy class. By modulating how we account for these causal relationships, we end up with multiple
alternative circuits, or a family of circuits for each C(n,m) strategy class. Each circuit in the family is
a model of the micro-macro relationship and so serves as a hypothesis for how strategies combine over
nodes (inputs) to produce to the target output [Lee et al. 2014]. We test the circuits against each other
in simulation to determine which can best recover the actual measured macroscopic behavior of our
system and other fine grained statistics.
We find that (1) a variant of the C(2, 1) circuit, with the measured ∆P , captures some important
features of the microscopic behavior of the system, (2) but that the distribution of fight sizes is de-
generate over configurations of the C(2, 1) circuit parameter space. Although our analyses support the
conclusion that the distribution of fight sizes results from the summed contributions of the ∆P in the
C(2, 1) circuit, we note that the degeneracy of the distribution of fight sizes for C(2, 1) parameter space
coupled to the observation that the C(2, 1) circuit is extremely complex with many precise, tiny pa-
rameters, suggests that the exact measured values of ∆P may not matter. A natural next step is to
systematically reduce the dimensionality of the circuit. Our goal is two-fold: to find the a parsimonious
description of the generative process that is also consistent with what we know about the information
the monkeys use to make decisions—a cognitive effective theory.
3. SPARSE SOCIAL CIRCUIT CONSTRUCTION
Our approach is to compress the time series data to build a more compact circuit. Using a technique
from neuroscience called sparse coding [Olshausen and Field 1997], we extract the individuals and
subgroups that are regular and predictable conflict participants [Daniels et al. 2012]. We show an
example from this process in Figure 3. Between these sparse groups, we search for ∆P strategies as
specified in Eq 1, a space we denote as C(si, sj), where the sizes of groups 1 ≤ |si|, |si| ≤ 5. Consistent
with previous results [DeDeo et al. 2010], we find more significant C(2, 1) and less significant C(1, 1)
strategies than would be expected from a null permutation of the data. On the other hand, we also find
evidence for other strategy classes beyond the three explored in previous work.
Since we expect that important social groups in the data set constitute relevant features for strategy
formation, we also allow for strategies of the form C(si, 1), that is information that individuals use to
form strategic decisions based on previous participation of a sparse group. Even with this addition, we
have ∼12 sparse groups and so the number of strategic edges that can exist on this graph are several
Collective Intelligence 2014.
Capturing collective conflict dynamics with sparse social circuits • 1:3
orders smaller than the bipartite C(2, 1), a lesser cognitive burden on individuals who might use a
similar model to predict conflict behavior.
Compared to other models that have been proposed for this system, the C(si, sj&1) sparse circuit
constitutes a comparatively reasonable fit despite being far more cognitively and computationally par-
simonious in the number of possible strategies.
Fig. 1. Example of sparse basis circuit obtained by sparse cod-
ing. Individuals in light blue circles are part of groups in dark
blue. Individuals not in basis groups are green. For example,
individual Vf is in a basis group alone. Eo and Ob appear in
multiple different basis groups in this solution. We only show
the top 15 largest ∆P significant with p ≤ 0.05; these are all
positive. This circuit is simpler than the C(2, 1) network in so
far as it has many fewer nodes and these nodes are composed of
the regular and predictable individuals.
4. CONCLUSION
We have proposed an approach for reconstructing the microscopic, strategic behavior of components
and individuals in social systems. This approach involves extracting component decision-making strate-
gies from time series data on competitive interactions and constructing circuits that specify how these
strategies combine to produce functionally important macroscopic properties that describe social struc-
ture.
With the exception of a few life history variables, it is not yet known what the important macroscopic
properties are in biological and social systems. As we refine our understanding of the micro to macro
mapping through construction of “full” circuits capturing the detailed microscopic behavior and prune
these circuits to construct cognitive effective theories for the macroscopic output, we gain insight into
the what properties of the time series data constitute the “right” input and hence the building blocks of
our system. By investigating whether our most accurate, empirically justified circuits can also account
for other potentially important macroscopic properties, we can begin to establish which macroscopic
properties might be fundamental and what their relation is to one another, thereby moving towards a
thermodynamics of biological collectives [Flack 2014].
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